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Articles

TRUE GOD OF THE NEXT JUSTICE
J. Gregory Sidak*
I. INTRODUCTION

For a decade or more, American constitutional discourse
has emitted a detectable odor of bigotry toward Roman Catholics who embrace the papal encyclicals of Pope John Paul II.
The day after President George Bush nominated Judge Clarence
Thomas to the Supreme Court of the United States in 1991, Virginia Governor Douglas Wilder said that, although the judge was
"qualified" to sit on the Court, "he's indicated he's a very devout
Catholic, and that issue is before us." 1 The Governor told reporters, "The question is: How much allegiance does [Mr. Thomas] have to the Pope?" 2 At the time, it had been more than
three decades since Americans overcame fears of papists in high
places to put William Brennan on the Supreme Coure and John
* F. K. Weyerhaeuser Fellow in Law and Economics, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. I thank Walter Berns, Kathleen A. Brady, Hillel Fradkin, Mary Ann Glendon, Bishop Ronald H. Haines, Michael W. McConnell, Father
Richard John Neuhaus, Judge John T. Noonan, Jr., Michael Novak, Michael Stokes
Paulsen, Reverend Dr. John Polkinghorne, Reverend William M. Shand III, Steven D.
Smith, Thomas A. Smith, and Judge Stephen F. Williams for their generous comments.
The views expressed here are solely my own. This essay was in press at the time of the
nomination of Senator John Ashcroft to be Attorney General of the United States in
January 2001, and I have not attempted to expand the scope of the essay to address violations of the Religious Test Clause with respect to executive branch officials.
1. Gov. Wilder Is Questioning Role of Thomas's Religion, Wall St. J. A8 (July 3,
1991) (quoting Gov. Douglas Wilder).
2. Id.; see also Stephen L. Carter, The Culture of Disbelief How American Law
and Politics Trivialize Religious Devotion 57, 287 n.24 (Doubleday, 1993) ("And then
there is the prominent feminist who grumbled in the summer of 1991 that there are too
many Catholics on the Supreme Court-discussing Roman Catholics the way that Pat
Buchanan discusses homosexuals").
3. Sec Kim Isaac Eisler, A Justice for All (Simon & Schuster, 1993).
9
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Kennedy in the White House. 4 Anti-Catholic prejudice has been
cited, however, as a factor in Alfred E. Smith's loss to Herbert
Hoover in the presidential election of 1928. Arthur Schlesinger
has written that "beneath the surface maneuvers of the campaign was the slanderous undercurrent of religious bigotrywhispers that Smith's election would bring the Pope to America,
that all Protestant marriages would be annulled and all Protestant children declared bastards. " 5
The intolerance of Governor Wilder's remarks in 1991
seemed all the more inexplicable because he was the first African American to occupy the governor's mansion in the former
capital of the Confederacy, and thus his own electoral achievement testified in some measure to the ability of American democracy to overcome the invidious discrimination of the past.
Governor Wilder's remarks caused such indignation that he was
forced to retract them the following day. 6 Journalists focused on
the possible damage to the governor's political career7 but overlooked the larger issue: Here was a prominent public official
with presidential ambitions who was evidently unaware that Article VI of the Constitution contains the Religious Test Clause,
which provides that "no religious Test shall ever be required as a
Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United
States. " 8 In addition to that provision, the Senate, in the discharge of its Advice and Consent duties, 9 cannot quiz a Supreme
Court nominee about his religion as a condition of confirming
him, lest the individual senators violate their own oaths "to support this Constitution," 10 an obligation that necessarily includes
supporting the Constitution's prohibition against religious tests.
Perhaps even more surprising than Governor Wilder's remark
was the reaction of Senator Orrin Hatch, a Mormon from Utah
and a senior Republican on (and future chairman of) the Senate
Judiciary Committee: "I think it's fair to ask if [Judge Thomas's]
Catholic faith means he would blindly follow the pope. You can
4. See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the
White House 6-7 (Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965).
5. See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt: The Crisis of the Old Order, 1919-1933 at 128 (Houghton Mifflin Co., 1957).
6. Donald P. Baker and David S. Broder, Wilder in Hot Water, Wash. Post C1
(July 4, 1991).
7. Donald P. Baker, Contrite Wilder Says He Was Misunderstood, Wash. Post A1
(July 8, 1991).
8. U.S. Canst., Art. VI,§ 3, cl. 2.
9. Id. Art. II,§ 2, cl. 2 (the president "shall nominate, and by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint ... Judges of the supreme Court").
10. Id. Art. VI,§ 3, cl. 1.
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ask the question in a sophisticated way that would be less offensive than what Wilder said, but I don't think he's out of line to
raise these questions." 11 Thus, this prominent Republican on the
Senate Judiciary Committee seemed as unfamiliar with the Religious Test Clause as did Governor Wilder.
Despite this evident unfamiliarity of some senior politicians
with the Religious Test Clause, it may be regarded as some
measure of official toleration of religion that the Supreme Court
has never been required to decide a case in which a religious test
was required of a national officeholder. As recently as 1961,
however, the Court unanimously struck down Maryland's requirement that officeholders declare their belief in the existence
of God. Interpreting the Free Exercise Clause 12 and the Establishment Clause, 13 added to the Constitution in 1791 through the
First Amendment, Justice Hugo Black wrote for the Court in
Torcaso v. Watkins, "We repeat and again reaffirm that neither a
State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a
person 'to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. ,,~ 4 Laurence Tribe, writing in his influential treatise several years before
the Thomas nomination, concluded that, "[a]s a practical matter," the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses "are dispositive in cases challenging alleged 'religious tests'" such that the
Religious Test Clause of Article VI "is now of little independent
significance." 15
On narrow, legal grounds Professor Tribe's assessment may
be too sanguine in the case of a judicial nomination, for the con-

11. Baker and Broder, Wilder in Hot Water at C5 (cited in note 6) (quoting Sen.
Orrin Hatch).
12. U.S. Cons!., Amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free
exercise (of religion]").
13. Id. ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion").
14. 367 U.S. 488,495 (1961) (quoting without citation Everson v. Board of Ed., 330
U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947)). In Everson, which was decided under the Establishment Clause,
the Court further stated: "No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs .... " 330 U.S. at 15-16.
15. Sec Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1155 n.l (Foundation
Press, 2d ed. 1988) (citing Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 489 n.1; American Communications Ass'n
v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 414-15 (1950); Anderson v. Laird, 316 F. Supp. 1081, 1093
(D.D.C. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 466 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1972). For analysis of the
Religious Test Clause, see Gerald V. Bradley, The No Religious Test Clause and the Constitution of Religious Liberty: A Machine That Has Gone of Itself, 37 Case W. Res. L.
Rev. 674 (1987); see also Thomas B. McAffee, The Federal System as Bill of Rights:
Original Understandings, Modern Misreadings, 43 Viii. L. Rev. 17, 93 (1998); John Witte,
Jr., The Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion in the American Constitutional Experiment, 71 Notre Dame L. Rev. 372 (1996); Michael E. Smith, The Special Place of Religion in the Constitution, 1983 S. Ct. Rev. 83.
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firmation or rejection of a nominee would not require Congress
to breach the prohibition that "Congress shall make no law"
concerning the establishment or free exercise of religion. A confirmation vote (like a legislative chaplaincy) is not the enactment
of a law, and thus religious discrimination in the confirmation or
rejection of Supreme Court nominees might find a loophole in
the First Amendment. More generally, the Wilder imbroglio
demonstrated that the development of jurisprudence on the First
Amendment's religion clauses should not be taken to obviate an
explicit constitutional prohibition of the sort that the Religious
Test Clause embodies. Wilder's comments were consistent with
Justice Joseph Story's assessment in 1833 that "[t]he framers of
the constitution .... knew, that bigotry was unceasingly vigilant
in its stratagems, to secure to itself an exclusive ascendancy over
the human mind; and that intolerance was ever ready to arm itself with all the terrors of the civil power to exterminate those,
who doubted its dogmas, or resisted its infallibility." 16
Religion and politics may forever be a volatile mix. In any
presidential election, the views of a candidate's likely Supreme
Court nominees provide a lively topic for debate. In current
times, this controversy is surely due in large measure to the fact
that nominations to the Court are seen as the vehicle by which
the law and politics of abortion change in the United States. In
the 2000 presidential election, for example, Vice President Al
Gore said, "Not only a woman's right to choose, but a lot of our
individual rights and civil rights are going to be at risk if the Republican Party controls the majority on the Supreme Court for
the next 30 or 40 years." 17 In June 2000, the Supreme Court
struck down, 5-to-4, in Stenberg v. Carhart Nebraska's prohibition on "partial birth" abortion, and thus produced a new ruling
on this controversial subject only weeks before the Democratic
and Republican conventions. 18 President Clinton warned on the
day of the Carhart ruling that the Supreme Court appointments
of his successor would determine whether Roe v. Wade "will either be maintained or overturned." 19 The same day, in the
closely watched U.S. senatorial race in New York, candidate
16. Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 971, at
690 (1833) (Ronald D. Rotunda and John E. Nowak, eds., Carolina Academic Press,
1987).
17. Jackie Calmes, Makeup of Supreme Court Becomes a Campaign Issue, Wall St.
J. A28 (Apr. 4, 2000) (quoting Vice President AI Gore).
18. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
19. See Press Conference by the President, Weekly Camp. Pres. Doc. (June 28,
2000).
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Hillary Rodham Clinton stated: "My position is clear: as a member of the United States Senate, I will not vote for a nominee to
the Supreme Court who would oppose Roe." 20 She challenged
her rival, a Roman Catholic, to take the same pledge. 21 The
following week, the New York Times reported on its front page,
"Vice President Al Gore, the presumptive Democratic nominee,
seized on the close vote [in Carhart] to warn that Mr. Bush, if
elected, would appoint conservative Supreme Court justices hostile to abortion rights. " 22
To be sure, other social issues are swept up in the question
of Supreme Court nominations, but none has been so polarizing
since the 1970s as abortion. Abortion remains the festering sore
of American constitutional discourse? 3 Given that cultural and
political dynamic, the religious views of a Supreme Court nominee have become a crude proxy for whether the prospective Justice will vote for or against the perpetuation of a constitutionally
protected right to an abortion. 2 The same crude proxy has been
20. See Hillary in Agreement with Stenberg v. Carhart; Supreme Court Decision
Reaffirms Roe v. Wade, June 28, 2000 <http://www.hillary2000.org/news/articles/000628.
html>.
21. See id. Ms. Clinton's rival, Representative Rick Lazio, identified himself as a
Catholic. See <http://congress.org/cgi-binlmember.pl?dir=congressorg2&_member=ny
02>.
22. See Jim Yardley, Bush's Choices for Court Seen as Moderates, N.Y. Times 1
(July 9, 2000); see also Joan Biskupic, A Divided High Court to Revisit Abortion, Wash.
Post A3 (Apr. 23, 2000) (discussing potential political ramifications of Carhart for 2000
presidential election). The subject of abortion and its relevance to Supreme Court nominations was extensively discussed by Vice President Gore and Governor George W.
Bush during the first televised debate on October 3, 2000. See Debate Transcripts: The
First 2000 Gore-Bush Presidential Debate (television broadcast, Oct. 3, 2000) (available at
<www.debates.org/pagesl trans2000a.html> ).
23. The national discussion of abortion also has affected how religious considerations have influenced the terms of debate on completely different issues. For example, in
their 1983 pastoral letter, The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response, the
National Conference of Catholic Bishops articulated a Catholic position on nuclear
weapons and deterrence. As George Weigel has noted in his book on the Catholic perspective on war, the debate on abortion informed the bishops' position on nuclear war:
The bishops urged "reverence for life" throughout American society. Abortion
blunted our sense of the sacredness of human life. In a country where the unborn were wantonly killed, "How can we expect people to feel righteous revulsion at the act or threat of killing non-combatants in war?" There were differences between taking life in abortion and taking life in war. Still, the bishops
pleaded "with all who would work to end the scourge of war to begin by defending life at its most defenseless, the life of the unborn."
George Weigel, Tranquillitas Ordinis: The Present Failure and Future Promise of American Catholic Thought on War and Peace 274 (Oxford U. Press, 1987) (quoting National
Conference of Catholic Bishops, The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response 285, 286, 289 (1983)).
24. For a similar critique, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Straightening Out The Confirmation Mess, 105 Yale L.J. 549 (1995) (reviewing Stephen L. Carter, The Confirmation
Mess: Cleaning up the Federal Appointments Process (1994)).
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employed outside the nomination context as well. In 1995, for
example, parties to an abortion rights case in the Ninth Circuit
petitioned Circuit Judge John T. Noonan, Jr., a Catholic, to
recuse himself on the grounds that his "fervently-held religious
beliefs would compromise [his] ability to apply the law." 25 Judge
Noonan denied the petition for recusal on the grounds that it
would violate the Religious Test Clause. 26 Simply put, investigation of a jurist's personal religious beliefs-a privacy issue if ever
one existed-has evidently become regarded by many involved
in the political discourse as socially justifiable in the defense of,
or in opposition to, those constitutional interpretations that have
created and extended a woman's right to an abortion. In addition to presenting the quintessential privacy issue under the
Constitution, the Religious Test Clause also should be seen as
the quintessential example of a rule against unconstitutional
conditions. As the Court observed in Torcaso, "The fact ... that
a person is not compelled to hold public office cannot possibly
be an excuse for barring him from office by state-imposed criteria forbidden by the Constitution." 27
Some political figures have resisted this intrusion into matters of religious faith. In the Democratic primaries of the 2000
election, Senator Bill Bradley flatly refused to answer any question from reporters concerning his personal religious beliefs. 28
That position, however, is distinguishable from a Supreme Court
nominee's, as Senator Bradley had already announced his position on abortion (he was pro-choice), such that a reporter's inquiry into his religious views would be unnecessary to infer his
likely views on abortion. Few sitting judges, in contrast, would
publicly express views on a subject that would be so controversial and so likely to generate litigation that might come before
their courts. To do so might create an appearance of judicial
partiality.
In the remainder of this Essay, I explain that, without the
active vigilance of the Senate, the Religious Test Clause is incapable of protecting religious freedom in the face of the intensity
25. Feminist Women's Health Center v. Codispoti, 69 F.3d 399 (9th Cir. 1995).
Judge Noonan, a former Boalt Hall law professor, is a distinguished scholar on law and
religion. See, e.g., John T. Noonan, Jr., The Lustre of Our Country: The American Experience of Religious Freedom (U. of California Press, 1998).
26. Feminist Women's Health Center, 69 F.3d at 400-01.
27. Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 495-96; sec generally Richard A. Epstein, Bargaining With
the State (Princeton U. Press, 1995).
28. Sec Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., He Won't Tell. Should We Care?, N.Y. Times§
4, at 19 (Jan. 9, 2000).
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of efforts to probe the judicial philosophy of Supreme Court
nominees on the subject of abortion. In Part II, I briefly discuss
the historical origins of the Religious Test Clause. Despite the
noble ambitions of that constitutional guarantee, religious intolerance was directed only a dozen years later at one of America's
forefathers of religious liberty, Thomas Jefferson. The guarantee is a fragile one indeed.
In Part Ill, I examine the relevance of the Religious Test
Clause to the nomination and confirmation of Supreme Court
Justices and to their personal views about abortion as a theological matter. I argue that it is both intractable and improper for
the Senate to question a nominee about either his religious sect
or the intensity of his religious devotion. Although I focus on
the kind of inquiry by which the Senate would violate the Religious Test Clause, the following analysis would apply equally to
the president's use of a religious filter to qualify or disqualify
candidates for judicial nominations according to their likely
views on abortion as a constitutional matter. A president's use
of an abortion litmus test that relied on the religious beliefs of a
prospective judicial nominee would be an illegitimate use of the
appointment power, 29 and, by obviously violating the Religious
Test Clause (and the religion clauses of the First Amendment),
would necessarily violate the president's oath to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States. " 30
In Part IV, I explain why, in the absence of punishment imposed by the Senate for misconduct by its members, it is unlikely
that any public sanction or private remedy would be forthcoming
if a senator violated the prohibition against religious tests in
connection with a judicial nomination. If the Senate does not
take that responsibility seriously, our ability as a nation to vindicate the goal of the Religious Test Clause will, as a practical matter, be limited to the ability of good persons to denounce
through strictly nonlegal means the bad ethics of any person who
would violate another's freedom of conscience for political gain.

29. See U.S. Const., Art. II,§ 2, cl. 2.
30. See id. § 1, cl. 8. The same question arises with respect to the appointment of
executive branch officials, such as the Attorney General.
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II. ORIGINS OF THE PROHIBITION AGAINST
RELIGIOUS TESTS
To any student of American history it should be ironic that
a Governor of Virginia would be the one to have pronounced
Judge Thomas's religious beliefs relevant to his qualifications to
serve on the Supreme Court. Governor Wilder's distant predecessor, Thomas Jefferson, regarded his drafting of the Statute of
Virginia for Religious Freedom in 1779 to be one of only three
achievements of his remarkable life worthy of inscription on his
tombstone. 31 The Supreme Court observed in Torcaso:
It is true that there is much historical precedent for ... laws

[imposing religious tests]. Indeed, it was largely to escape religious test oaths and declarations that a great many of the
early colonists left Europe and came here hoping to worship
in their own way. It soon developed, however, that many of
those who had fled to escape religious test oaths turned out to
be perfectly willing, when they had the power to do so, to
force dissenters from their faith to take test oaths in conformity with that faith. 32

After the American Revolution, a number of states still had
religious tests for officeholders that barred Catholics, Jews, and
atheists. 33 Jefferson drafted the Statute of Virginia for Religious
Freedom to provide that "proscribing any citizen as unworthy
[of] the public confidence by laying upon him an incapacity of
being called to the offices of trust and emolument, unless he profess or renounce this or that religious opinion, is depriving him
injuriously of those privileges and advantages to which in common with his fellow citizens he has a natural right. " 34 Thanks to
Jefferson's perseverance for more than six years, Virginia enacted his draft statute in 1786 and led the way for other states
similarly to dismantle religious barriers. Georgia abolished reli-

31. See Noble E. Cunningham, Jr., In Pursuit of Reason: The Life of Thomas Jefferson 349 (Ballantine Books, 1987). The two other accomplishments in which Jefferson
took special pride were the founding of the University of Virginia and the drafting of the
Declaration of Independence. Id.
32. Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 490.
33. Sec Richard B. Morris, The Forging of the Union, 1781-1789 at 172 (Harper &
Row, 1987). Professor Morris reports: "The disqualification in the Maryland Constitution barring Jews from public office was not removed until1825; Rhode Island, not until
the adoption of the state constitution in 1842, and North Carolina not until 1868." Id. at
358-59 n.28.
34. Statute of Virginia for Religious Freedom (drafted 1779; enacted 1786), reprinted in Adrienne Koch and William Peden, cds., The Life and Selected Writings of
Thomas Jefferson 311,312 (Random House, 1944).
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gious tests for office holding in 1789 and was followed by Pennsylvania and South Carolina in 1790, Delaware in 1792, and Vermont in 1793. 35
A. THE DRAFTING AND RATIFICATION OF
THE RELIGIOUS TEST CLAUSE

At the Constitutional Convention in 1787, the Framers
thought that the prohibition against religious tests for national
officeholders was so elemental that they incorporated it directly
into the Constitution, even though they did not adopt the Bill of
Rights, with its two religion clauses in the First Amendment, until four years later. 36 Initially, Roger Sherman of Connecticut
thought that the prohibition on religious tests was unnecessary
because "the prevailing liberality" would be "a sufficient security
against such tests." 37 But his optimism was challenged by an impassioned letter on September 7, 1787, to the Convention from
Jonas Phillips, a Philadelphia Jew. 38 Phillips implored the delegates to delete from any oath of national office the religious test
then found in Pennsylvania's constitution, which required every
officeholder to swear that the New Testament was given by divine inspiration. 39 He wrote that such a belief would be "absolutly [sic] against the Religious principle of a Jew" and that it
would be "against his Conscience to take any such oath." 40 He
reminded the Convention that "the Jews have been true and
faithful whigs, and during the late Contest with England they
have been foremost in aiding and assisting the States with their
lifes and fortunes, they have supported the Cause, have bravely

35. Morris, The Forging of the Union at 172 (cited in note 33). Jefferson's Statute
of Virginia for Religious Freedom has continued to influence the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1947).
36. U.S. Const., Amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof'). For an insightful and exhaustive analysis of the history of the Framers' thoughts on religious freedom, particularly the
influential thinking of James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, see Kathleen A. Brady,
Fostering Harmony Among the Justices: How Contemporary Debates in Theology Can
Help to Reconcile the Divisions on the Court Regarding Religious Expression by the State,
75 Notre Dame L. Rev. 433,440-77 (1999).
37. James Madison, Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, at 561
(W.W. Norton & Co., 1966 ed.).
38. Letter from Jonas Phillip to the President and Members of the Convention
(Sept. 7, 1787), reprinted in 3 Max Farrand, ed., The Records of the Federal Convention
of 1787, at 78 (Yale U. Press, 1966 ed.).
39. ld.
40. !d.
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faught and bleed for liberty which they Can not Enjoy." 41 Phillips concluded his letter with "prayers ... unto the Lord" that
"the almighty God of our father Abraham Isaac and Jacob endue this Noble Assemb~ with wisdom Judgement and unamity
[sic] in their Councells." 2 The Framers, of course, did not adopt
any religious test, let alone one of the sort that Phillips feared.
But the Framers also did not embrace Sherman's initial assessment that the Religious Test Clause was unnecessary.
Further commentary by the Framers on the meaning and
perceived importance of the prohibition against religious tests
appears in Edmund Randolph's explanation of the new Constitution to the Virginia Convention during the ratification debates
in 1788:
The senators and representatives, members of the state legislatures, and executive and judicial officers, are bound by oath,
or affirmation, to support this constitution. This only binds
them to support it in the exercise of the powers constitutionally given it. The exclusion of religious tests is an exception
from this general provision, with respect to oaths, or affirmations. Although officers, &c. are to swear that they will support this constitution, yet they are not bound to support one
mode of worship, or to adhere to one particular sect. It puts
all sects on the same footing. A man of abilities and character, of any sect whatever, may be admitted to any office or
43
public trust under the United States.

In the style of James Madison's discussion of factions in Federalist No. 1044 and, more specifically in Federalist No. 50, 45
Randolph saw the Religious Test Clause as ensuring that reli41.

!d. at 79.
!d.
43. Edmund Randolph in the Virginia Convention (June 10, 1788), reprinted in
Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention at 310 (cited in note 38).
44. The Federalist No. 10 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke cd., Wesleyan U.
Press 1961).
45. The Federalist No. 50 (James Madison) (Jacob Cooke, ed., Wesleyan U. Press
1961). Madison wrote:
Whilst all authority in [the federal republic of the United States] will be derived
from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so
many parts, interests and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals or of
the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority. In a free government, the security for civil rights must be the same as for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in
the other, in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in both cases will
depend on the number of interests and sects; and this may be presumed to depend on the extent of country and number of people comprehended under the
same government.
!d. at 351-52.
42.
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gious sects counterbalance one another to prevent the establishment of a national religion:
I am a friend to a variety of sects, because they keep one another in order. How many different sects are we composed of
throughout the United States? How many different sects will
be in congress? We cannot enumerate the sects that may be in
congress. And there are so many now in the United States
that they will prevent the establishment of any one sect in
prejudice to the rest, and will forever oppose all attempts to
infringe religious liberty. If such an attempt be made, will not
the alarm be sounded throughout America? If congress be as
wicked as we are foretold they will, they would not run the
risk of exciting the resentment of all, or most of the religious
46
sects in America.

Randolph made these comments three years before the Bill of
Rights. His rationale for the Religious Test Clause clearly anticipated both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment.
B. RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE TOWARD JEFFERSON'S DEISM
DURING AND AFTER THE ELECTION OF 1800

Questions about the religious beliefs of a presidential candidate figured prominently only twelve years later. That candidate was none other than Thomas Jefferson, the author of the
Statute of Virginia for Religious Freedom. Although raised in
the Anglican Church, Jefferson by 1800 had embraced deism. 47
As early as 1787 he wrote:
[R]ead the New Testament. It is the history of a personage
called Jesus. Keep in your eye the opposite pretensions: 1, of
those who say he was begotten by God, born of a virgin, suspended and reversed the laws of nature at will, and ascended
bodily into heaven; and 2, of those who say he was a man of
illegitimate birth, of a benevolent heart, enthusiastic mind,
who set out without pretensions to divinity, ended in believing
46. Edmund Randolph in the Virginia Convention (June 10, 1788), reprinted in
Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention at 310 (cited in note 38); see also Forrest
McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution 42 (U.
Press of Kansas, 1985).
47. See Cunningham, In Pursuit of Reason at 225 (cited in note 31); Merrill D. Peterson, Thomas Jefferson and the New Nation: A Biography 353-54, 956-60 (Oxford U.
Press, 1970); Dumas Malone, 3 Thomas Jefferson and His Time: Jefferson and The Ordeal of Liberty 481 (Little, Brown & Co., 1962). In her discussion of Jefferson's religious
views, Professor Brady notes that Jefferson "often called himself a Unitarian Christian
rather than a deist." See Brady, Fostering Harmony Among the Justices at 450 n.74 (cited
in note 36).
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set out without pretensions to divinity, ended in believing
them, and was punished capitally for sedition, by being gibbeted, according to the Roman law, which punished the first
commission of that offence by whipping, and the second by
exile, or death in furea ....
Do not be frightened from this inquiry by any fear of its consequences. If it ends in a belief that there is no God, you will
find incitements to virtue in the comfort and pleasantness you
feel in its exercise, and the love of others which it will procure
you. If you find reason to believe there is a God, a consciousness that you are acting under his eye, and that he approves
you, will be a vast additional incitement; if that there be a future state, the hope of a happy existence in that increases the
appetite to deserve it; if that Jesus was also a God, you will be
comforted by a belief of his aid and love . . . . Your own reason is the only oracle given you by heaven, and you are answerable, not for the rightness, but uprightness of the deci.

SlOn.

48

It is important to place within historical context Jefferson's rationalist attempt to restate Christian teachings as a system of
moral philosophy rather than a religion.
In Philadelphia in October of 1789, there was convened another kind of constitutional convention. With the American
Revolution, the Anglican Church in the United States changed
from the Church of England to the Protestant Episcopal Church
of the United States. That change also necessitated the revision
and ratification, in 1789, of The Book of Common Prayer, to reflect the disestablishment of the Church of England in the
United States. 49 The Episcopal Church "was in the first place
drawn to those alterations in the Liturgy which became necessary in the prayers for our Civil Rulers, in consequence of the
48. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Peter Carr (Aug. 10, 1787), reprinted in Koch
and Peden, eds., The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson at 429,432-33 (cited
in note 34). Some of Jefferson's writings display outright condescension toward religious
expression. In his travel through France in 1787, for example, he noted that farmers in
Champagne were clustered in villages rather than dispersed in farmhouses. He therefore
asked: "Are they thus collected by that dogma of their religion, which makes them believe, that to keep the Creator in good humor with His own works, they must mumble a
mass every day?" Memoranda taken on a Journey from Paris into the Southern Parts of
France, and Northern Italy, in the year 1787 (Mar. 3, 1787), reprinted in id. at 135.
49. The Ratification of The Book of Common Prayer (1789), reprinted in The Book
of Common Prayer 8 (Oxford U. Press, 1977 ed.). Apart from Jefferson, the Episcopalians among the nation's founders included George Washington, Patrick Henry, John Jay,
Robert Morris, John Marshall, and John Randolph. See FrankS. Mead, Handbook of
Denominations in the United States 131 (Abingdon Press, 6th ed. 1975).

2001]

TRUE GOD OF THE NEXT JUSTICE

21

Revolution," but the Church emphasized that it was "far from
intending to depart from the Church of England in any essential
point of doctrine, discipline, or worship." 50
In 1801, the Episcopal Church further established its Articles of Religion, which deleted prior Anglican references to the
King or Queen of England being the head of the Church. 51 The
1801 Articles of Religion also detailed the doctrines of the Episcopal Church, such as the Trinity, "the Word or Son of God,
which was made very Man," and the Resurrection. 52 In addition,
the Articles of Religion required: "The Nicene Creed, and that
which is commonly called the Apostle's Creed, ought thoroughly
to be received and believed: for they may be proved by most certain warrants of Holy Scripture." 53
The doctrinal precepts of the former Church of England in
America places in context the controversy over Jefferson's religious views in the presidential election one year earlier. His
Federalist opponents in 1800 accused Jefferson, in the words of
one minister, of "disbelief of the Holy Scriptures" and "rejection
of the Christian Religion," and they warned that "the voice of
the nation in calling a deist to the first office must be construed
into no less than a rebellion against God. " 54 The nation, of
course, did not reject Jefferson on those grounds, though Federalist attacks of this nature continued even while he was in office.
Jefferson's religious views were intensely rationalist. While
president, Jefferson in his leisure time conducted research for his
Philosophy of Jesus, in which he clipped and assembled passages
from the Gospels of Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John to produce
a summary of his religious faith and to compare the teachings of
Jesus with those of Socrates. 55 In the words of historian Noble
Cunningham, this process involved Jefferson's "[e]xcising from
the Gospels the supernaturalism that he was convinced was
added by later corruptors of the simple moral teachings of Jesus"

50. Preface (1789), reprinted in The Book of Common Prayer at 9, 10-11 (cited in
note 49).
51. Articles of Religion, Art. XXXVII (Protestant Episcopal Church in the United
States of America, Sept. 12, 1801), reprinted in The Book of Common Prayer at 867,875
(cited in note 49).
52. Id., Arts. I, II, IV.
53. Id., Art. VIII.
54. Sec Cunningham, In Pursuit of Reason at 225 (cited in note 31) (quoting William Linn, Serious Considerations on the Election of a President: Addressed to the Citizens
of the United States (Sherman, Mershon & Thomas, 1800)).
55. Id. at 256.
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and leaving "what he regarded as Jesus' authentic words." 56 In
his own time, Jefferson's translation of Christian scripture into a
rational, moral philosophy of Jesus struck many as unconventional if not heretical. Jefferson later wrote to John Adams that,
"by cutting verse by verse out of the printed book, and arranging
the matter which is evidently [Jesus') ... which is as easily distinguishable as diamonds in a dunghill," Jefferson was able to distill
"the most sublime and benevolent code of morals which has ever
been offered to man. "57 Among the elements of Christian doctrine that Jefferson rejected-calling them "the imputation of
imposture, which has resulted from artificial systems, invented
by ultra-Christian sects, unauthorized by a single word ever uttered by [Jesus]" 58 -were "[t]he immaculate conception of Jesus,
His deification, the creation of the world by Him, His miraculous
powers, His resurrection and visible ascension, His corporeal
presence in the Eucharist, the Trinity, original sin, atonement,
regeneration, election, orders of Hierarchy, etc." 59
The controversial nature of such views of Jesus, particularly
circa 1800, cannot be overstated. Jefferson's proposition that Jesus was not resurrected from the dead- to take the most significant example-would strike many students of religion, in 1800 or
today, as antithetical to the most essential belief within Christianity. Jefferson's system of religious beliefs directly contradicted multiple elements of the Apostles' Creed, the Nicene
Creed, and other creeds that are fundamental statements of belief for numerous Christian denominations. 60 Jefferson once de56. Id. at 257.
57. Id. (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Oct. 12, 1813)).
Jefferson expressed his views in virtually identical language in a subsequent letter. See
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Short (Oct. 31, 1819), reprinted in Koch and
Peden, eds., The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson at 693,694 (cited in note
34). An earlier summary of Jefferson's analysis of the teachings of Jesus was contained
in Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Benjamin Rush (Apr. 21, 1803), reprinted in id. at
566. In that letter, Jefferson wrote:
[My views on religion] are the result of a life of inquiry and reflection, and
very different from that anti-Christian system imputed to me by those who
know nothing of my opinions. To the corruptions of Christianity I am, indeed,
opposed; but not to the genuine precepts of Jesus himself. I am a Christ.ian, in
the only sense in which he wished any one to be; sincerely attached to h1s doctrines, in preference to all others; ascribing to himself every human excellence;
and believing he never claimed any other.
!d. at 567 (emphasis in original).
58. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Short (Oct. 31, 1819) (cited in note
57).
59. !d. at 694 n.l.
60. The Apostles' Creed, reprinted in The Book of Common Prayer at 53-54 (cited
in note 49); The Niccne Creed, reprinted in id. at 326-27; Quicunque Vult (The Creed of
Saint Athanasius), reprinted in id. at 864-65; Definition of the Union of the Divine and
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dined a request to serve as a godfather on the grounds that he
"had never sense enough to comprehend the articles of faith of
the Church," by which he surely meant the Anglican Church. 61
The controversy over Jefferson's religious view in the presidential election of 1800 shows that, despite the existence of the
Religious Test Clause, Jefferson's adversaries showed little toleration for certain religious views in a leader that were likely to
offend or frighten traditional Christian believers. Those political
adversaries attempted scarcely a decade after the ratification of
the Constitution to make Jefferson's religious beliefs a disqualifying factor in the presidential election of 1800. Having survived
this political adversity to be elected president, Jefferson wrote in
1803:
I am moreover averse to the communication of my religious
tenets to the public; because it would countenance the
presumption of those who have endeavored to draw upon
them before that tribunal, and to seduce public opinion to
erect itself into that inquisition over the rights of conscience,
which the laws have so justly proscribed. It behooves every
man who values liberty of conscience for himself, to resist
invasions of it in the case of others; or their case may, by
change of circumstances, become his own. It behooves him,
too, in his own case, to give no example of concession,
betraying the common right of independent opinion, by
answering questions of faith, which the laws have left between
God and himself. 62

Human Natures in the Person of Christ (Council of Chalcedon, 451 A.D.), reprinted in
id. at 864. The Catechism of the Episcopal Church explains that the Apostles' Creed and
the Nicene Creed "are statements of our basic beliefs about God." An Outline of the
Faith Commonly Called the Catechism, reprinted in id. at 845, 851. On the theological
significance of retaining (within Roman Catholicism if not also within all of Christianity)
the Apostles' Creed as an original statement of Christian faith, see Karl Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Idea of Christianity 449 (William V. Dych,
trans., Crossroad, 1978).
A contemporary reminder of the conflict between Jefferson's moral philosophy of
Jesus and fundamental Christian doctrine is contained in Pope John Paul II's answer to
the question, "Is Jesus the Son of God?" See His Holiness John Paul II, Crossing the
Threshold of Hope 42-49 (Knopf, 1994). Pope John Paul II observes, "Christ does not
resemble Muhammad or Socrates or Buddha." Id. at 45. "The uniqueness of Christ," he
explains, "(is] indicated by Peter's words at Caesarea Philippi, is ... expressed by the
Creed. I d. at 45-46.
61. Quoted in Willard Sterne Randall, Thomas Jefferson: A Life 85 (Henry Holt &
Co., 1993).
62. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Benjamin Rush (Apr. 21, 1803), reprinted in
Koch and Peden, eds., The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson at 567 (cited in
note 57).
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It is not difficult to imagine that two centuries later, in a consid-

erably more secular America, a candidate or nominee for high
public office in the federal government who held as intense or as
controversial religious views as Jefferson did in 1800 would be
the subject of public speculation and innuendo about the probable influence of his religious beliefs on the discharge of his public duties.
III. RELIGIOUS TESTING OF SUPREME COURT
NOMINEES
Because of the controversy that abortion has engendered in
American public life since at least the Supreme Court's decision
in 1965 in Griswold v. Connecticut63 and Pope Paul VI's 1968 encyclical on contraception, 64 it would be naive to believe that the
imbroglio over Governor Wilder's 1991 comments about the
nomination of Justice Thomas will not repeat itself in the case of
some future Supreme Court nominee, if perhaps in more discreet terms. It is therefore useful to scrutinize more closely the
kind of information that religious questioning of Supreme Court
nominees would be intended to elicit and to consider the ramifications of such questions. Was it Governor Wilder's understanding of Judge Thomas's religious devotion that prompted the
Governor's indelicate remarks? Or was it Judge Thomas's strict
schooling in Catholicism per se?
Either prospect leads to an inappropriate line of questions
to pose to a judicial nominee. Contrary to what Senator Hatch's
remarks in 1991 might have suggested, the Senate would not
avoid violating the Religious Test Clause by questioning a Supreme Court nominee's religious beliefs "in a sophisticated way
that would be less offensive" 65 than Governor Wilder's statements about the need to question Judge Thomas concerning the
extent of his allegiance to the Pope. If anything, more "sophisticated" and "less offensive" religious testing of Supreme Court
nominees would draw the Senate more deeply into precisely the
territory that the Religious Test Clause forbade the government
to enter.
There is additionally a separation of powers issue here. If
the purpose of religious testing is to probe a nominee's likely
63. 381 u.s. 479 (1965).
64. Paul VI, Encyclical Letter Humane Vitae (July 25, 1968).
65. Baker and Broder, Wilder in Hot Water at C5 (cited in note 6) (quoting Sen.
Orrin Hatch).
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vote on a particularly controversial constitutional question, such
as a legal proposition concerning abortion rights, the nominee
would in effect be asked by the Senate (or by the president, in
screening the nominee) to render an advisory opinion, in violation of the "case or controversy" limitation on judicial power
under Article III. 66 If this argument is correct, it would of course
sweep more broadly than simply a prohibition on senatorial
questioning of judicial nominees on matters of religion. 67 One
possibility is that the Senate is not constitutionally forbidden to
elicit advisory opinions by posing questions about religious belief, but neither is a nominee constitutionally required to answer
them. This interpretation, however, is hardly satisfactory if its
practical effect is to discourage entire denominations of religious
believers from entering public service. As I argue below, a
nominee suffers a constitutional indignity simply upon being
questioned about his religious convictions by those possessing
the authority to confirm him to public office. Although this
question of advisory opinions is an interesting and subtle one, it
would lead the analysis away from the principle focus of this Essay, the Religious Test Clause.
Returning then to the infirmity of religious testing of judicial nominees under the Religious Test Clause, consider now the
difficulty of senatorial unease over a nominee's religious sect
and over a nominee's religious devotion.
A. OBJECTION TO RELIGIOUS SECT

Governor Wilder might have been concerned not with
Judge Thomas' religious devotion per se, but with the possibility
that his devotion to Catholic teachings on the specific subject of
abortion would predispose him as a Justice of the Supreme
Court to vote to uphold statutory regulations on the availability
of abortion-as Justice Thomas in fact did during his first year
on the Court 68 -or even to vote to overrule Roe v. Wade. 69

66.
67.
Labor v.
68.
69.

See U.S. Canst., Art. III,§ 2.
See generally Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 699 (1997); Alabama State Fed. of
McAdory, 325 U.S. 450,461 (1945).
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).

26

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 18:9

1. How Does the Pope Instruct Catholics-and Others-on
Abortion?

Given the intensity of discussion of whether a particular Supreme Court nominee would or would not be in the pocket of
the Pope, it is useful to interrupt the debate by clarifying first
how the Pope has actually instructed Catholics on the subject of
abortion. One senses that much of the debate occurs at a level
of what proponents and opponents of abortion rights think the
Pope has said on the subject. Pope John Paul II has provided an
accessible summary of his teaching in his essay, The Defense of
Every Life, published in his 1994 book. 70
Pope John Paul II begins by positing that "the right to life is
the fundamental right" and "means the right to be born and then
continue to live until one's natural end: 'As long as I live, I have
the right to live. "' 71 The application of this principle to the case
of abortion presents, in the Pope's assessment, "a particularly
delicate yet clear problem" 72 :
The legalization of the termination of pregnancy is none other
than the authorization given to an adult, with the approval of
an established law, to take the lives of children yet unborn
and thus incapable of defending themselves. It is difficult to
imagine a more unjust situation, and it is very difficult to speak
of obsession in a matter such as this, where we are dealing with
a fundamental imperative of every good conscience-the defense of the right to life of an innocent and defenseless human
. 73
bemg.

Pope John Paul II rejects the logic and rhetoric of "choice." He
disputes that "the woman should have the right to choose between giving life or taking it away from the unborn child" because the latter alternative entails "a clear moral evil" of violating the commandment against killing another human being. 74
Pope John Paul II sees no exception to this conclusion. 75 His prescription is for "radical solidarity with the woman," through
counseling centers and houses for teenage mothers, to help the
70. See Crossing the Threshold of Hope at 204-11 (cited in note 60). A theologically exhaustive presentation of Pope John Paul's teaching on abortion appeared in his
encyclical letter issued the following year. See John Paul II, Encyclical Letter Evangelium Vitae (Mar. 25, 1995) [hereinafter Evangelium Vitae].
71. See His Holiness John Paull/ at 204-05 (cited in note 60) (emphasis in original).
72. ld. at 205.
73. Id. (emphasis in original).
74. Id. (emphasis in original); see also id. at 210-11.
75. Id. at 205-06.
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mother bear her child. 76 "It is not right to leave her alone." 77 The
firmness of Pope John Paul Il's position reflects his assessment
that abortion is "a problem of tremendous importance" with
broad ramifications: "We cannot afford forms of permissiveness
that would lead directly to the trampling of human rights, and
also to the complete destruction of values which are fundamental not onl1s for the lives of individuals and families but for society itself." 8
These are hard words. It is not possible to reconcile Pope
John Paul ll's instructions on abortion with statutes or court decisions that permit abortion on demand. But the Pope's denunciation of abortion is not limited to criticizing the logic and
rhetoric of the pro-choice position. He directly condemns as a
matter of religious doctrine the state's role in the legalization of
abortion on demand. This condemnation is even more sustained
in the Pope's official pronouncements, and even more a direct
confrontation to the authority of civil law.
In his 1995 encyclical letter, Evangelium Vitae, Pope John
Paul II distinguishes between civil law and the moral law: "One
of the specific characteristics of present-day attacks on human
life ... consists in the trend to demand a legal justification for
them, as if they were rights upon which the State, at least under
certain conditions, must acknowledge as belonging to citizens." 79
In turn, the Pope argues, such legal justifications derive from the
contemporary understanding of democracy. He writes that, "in
the democratic culture of our time it is commonly held that the
legal system of any society should limit itself to taking account of
and accepting the convictions of the majority." 80 This orientation
of the legal system to satisfy majority preferences leads, in Pope
John Paul ll's view, to a moral relativism in which personal responsibility in the matter of preserving human life is abandoned:
[W]e have what appear to be two diametrically opposed tendencies. On the one hand, individuals claim for themselves in
the moral sphere the most complete freedom of choice and
demand that the State should not adopt or impose any ethical
position but limit itself to guaranteeing maximum space for
the freedom of each individual, with the sole limitation of not
infringing on the freedom and rights of any other citizen. On
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 207.
Id.
Id. at 208 (emphasis in original).
Sec Evangelium Vitae at '168 (cited in note 70) (emphasis in original).
Sec id. at 69.
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the other hand, it is held that, in the exercise of public and
professional duties, respect for other people's freedom of
choice requires that each one should set aside his or her own
convictions in order to satisfy every demand of the citizens
which is recognized and guaranteed by law; in carrying out
one's duties the only moral criterion should be what is laid
down by the law itself. Individual responsibility is thus turned
over to the civil law, with a renouncing of personal conscience,
at least in the public sphere. 81

In a manner reminiscent of the countermajoritarian rationale for
judicial review in American constitutional law, Pope John Paul
II sees the will of the majority as being subject to a higher, moral
constraint:
Democracy cannot be idolized to the point of making it a substitute for morality or a panacea for immorality. Fundamentally, democracy is a "system" and as such is a means and not
an end. Its "moral" value is not automatic, but depends on
conformity to the moral law to which it, like every other form
of human behaviour, must be subject: in other words, its morality depends on the morality of the ends which it pursues
and of the means which it employs .... [T]he value of democracy stands or falls with the values which it embodies and
82
promotes.

Pope John Paul II argues that the values embodied in and promoted by a democracy, "such as the dignity of every human person,"83 have an objective origin in natural law, which he believes
must motivate civil law also:
The basis of these values cannot be provisional and changeable "majority" opinions, but only the acknowledgment of an
objective moral law which, as the "natural law" written in the
human heart, is the obligatory point of reference for civil law
itself. If, as a result of a tragic obscuring of the collective conscience, an attitude of scepticism were to succeed in bringing
into question even the fundamental principles of the moral
law, the democratic system itself would be shaken in its foundations, and would be reduced to a mere mechanism for regu-

81. See id. (emphasis added). For a similar critique of the tendency of Congress to
debate the usc of military force in excessively legalistic terms that tend to obscure what I
have called the "moral visibility of collective action," see J. Gregory Sidak, To Declare
War, 41 Duke L.J. 27 (1991).
82. See Evangelium Vitae at 70 (cited in note 70).
83. See id.
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lating different and opposing interests on a purely empirical
84
basis.

The Pope therefore urges nations to reconcile their civil laws
with morallaw. 85
Pope John Paul Il's exhortation in this regard invokes the
same notions of inalienable rights found in the Declaration of
Independence and of fundamental rights of the Supreme Court's
late twentieth-century jurisprudence, though obviously to different effect than the Court's creation and extension of a constitutional right to abortion on demand:
It is ... urgently necessary, for the future of society and the

development of a sound democracy, to rediscover those essential and innate human and moral values which flow from
the very truth of the human being and express and safeguard
the dignity of the person: values which no individual, no majority and no State can ever create, modify or destroy, but
must only acknowledge, respect and promote.
Consequently there is a need to recover the basic elements
of a vision of the relationship between civil law and moral law,
which are put forward by the Church, but which are also part
of the patrimony of the great juridical traditions of humanity.
[C]ivil law must ensure that all members of society enjoy
respect for certain fundamental rights which innately belong
to the person, rights which every positive law must recognize
and guarantee. First and fundamental among these is the inviolable right to life of every innocent human being. While
public authority can sometimes choose not to put a stop to
something which-were it prohibited-would cause more serious harm, it can never presume to legitimize as a right of individuals-even if they are the majority of the members of society-an offence against other persons caused by the
disregard of so fundamental a right as the right to life. The
legal toleration of abortion or of euthanasia can in no way
claim to be based on respect for the conscience of others, precisely because society has the right and the duty to protect it-

84. See id.
85. One person commenting on a draft of this Essay remarked of this passage by
Pope John Paul II: "It seems to me that the Pope is getting dangerously close to the investiture conflicts of the middle ages where the Pope's predecessors succeeded for a time
in placing the Church above the State. Popes invested kings with their secular authority.
If we follow the Pope's line of reasoning, would we not be moving to a modern version of
investiture?"
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self against the abuses which can occur in the name of conscience and under the pretext of freedom. 86

In essence, Pope John Paul II goes toe to toe with secular court
decisions that base abortion rights on a notion of a fundamental
human right. The Pope defends his position by citing the Catholic Church's statements on human rights, as well as Saint Thomas
Aquinas's view that an unjust law violates natural law and thus is
not legitimate law. 87 Pope John Paul II therefore rejects the legitimacy of civil law that permits abortion: "Disregard for the
right to life, precisely because it leads to the killing of the person
whom society exists to serve, is what most directly conflicts with
the possibility of achieving the common good. Consequently, a
civil law authorizing abortion or euthanasia ceases by that very
fact to be a true, morally binding civillaw." 88
The Pope states plainly that abortion is a "crime[]which no
human law can claim to legitimize," and he counsels that
" [t ]here is no obligation in conscience to obey such laws; instead
there is a grave and clear obligation to oppose them by conscientious objection." 89 His scriptural support for such conscientious
objection includes the account in Exodus of the Jews in captivity
in Egypt:
In the Old Testament, precisely in regard to threats against
life, we find a significant example of resistance to the unjust
command of those in authority. After Pharaoh ordered the
killing of all newborn males, the Hebrew midwives refused.
"They did not do as the king of Egypt commanded them, but
let the male children live." But the ultimate reason for their
action should be noted: "the midwives feared God." It is precisely from obedience to God-to whom alone is due that fear
which is acknowledgment of his absolute sovereignty-that
the strength and the courage to resist unjust human laws are
90
born."

Although Pope John Paul II gives specific direction to legislators who must vote on legislation regulating abortion, 91 he has
no specific words for judges who will review such legislation. He
notes, in a sentence reminiscent of Jefferson, that the "right to

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See id.
See id.
Sec id.
See id.
See id.
See id.

'I 71 (emphasis in original).

'1'1 71-72.
'I 72.
'I 73 (emphasis in original).
(quoting Exodus 1:17) (citations omitted; emphasis in original).
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demand not to be forced to take part in morally evil actions ....
may require the sacrifice of prestigious professional positions or
the relinquishing of reasonable hopes of career advancement. " 92
A Catholic judge, therefore, is left to take guidance from the following general statement by the Pope on conscientious objection:
Christians, like all people of good will, are called upon under
grave obligation of conscience not to cooperate formally in
practices which, even if permitted by civil legislation, are contrary to God's law. Indeed, from the moral standpoint, it is
never licit to cooperate formally in evil. Such cooperation occurs when an action, either by its very nature or by the form it
takes in a concrete situation, can be defined as a direct participation in an act against innocent human life or a sharing in
the immoral intention of the person committing it. This cooperation can never be justified either by invoking respect for
the freedom of others or by appealing to the fact that civil law
permits it or requires it. Each individual in fact has moral responsibility for the acts which he personally performs; no one
can be exempted from this responsibility, and on the basis of
it everyone will be judged by God himself. 93
Thus, the Pope's teaching on abortion is judgmental and unequivocal. In his exhaustive biography of the Pope, George
Weigel calls the language of Evangelium Vitae "unsparing" in its
criticism of the legitimation of abortion by law-governed democracies.94 The Pope's condemnation of abortion admits no exceptions and is not qualified in lawyerly terms of which trimester is
permissible for the procedure or whether parental notification is
required. According to Pope John Paul II, the state's role in legitimizing abortion is contrary to natural law and moral teaching.
The civil law conferring abortion rights therefore lacks legitimate authority in his view. The Pope's absolute opposition to
abortion rests on a fundamental right to life and a duty not to
violate one of the Ten Commandments given to Moses on
Mount Sinai. 95

92. Sec id. 'I 74.
93. Sec id.
94. Sec George Weigel, Witness to Hope: The Biography of Pope John Paulll757
(Harper Collins, 1999).
95. Sec Crossing the Threshold of Hope at 210 (cited in note 60). Michael Novak
reminds me that the Pope fortifies his argument through faith by drawing upon reason
also: Scientific advances enable one to say that a fetus is life and, moreover, is a human
life that is uniquely distinct in a genetic sense from the mother's human life. See note
115.
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2. How Would the Senate Interrogate a Catholic Nominee on
His Adherence to the Pope's Instructions on Abortion?
To justify religious interrogation of a nominee because he is
a Catholic, and thus would be presumed to obey the Pope's instructions on matters such as abortion, would be to invite the
Senate to trespass onto precisely the terrain that the Framers
forbade. Suppose that members of the Senate Judiciary Committee asked a judicial nominee questions like, "Is it your religious belief that life begins at conception?" and "Does your religion consider abortion to be murder?" The rather plain
implication of such questions would be that affirmative answers
would result in certain Senators voting either for or against the
nominee's confirmation. Other questions might seem less inflammatory, more dryly academic: "Do you agree with paragraph 72 of Pope John Paul Il's encyclical Evangelium Vitae that
it is necessary for the civil law to conform with moral law?" It
does not require a particularly imaginative sequence of questions
of this sort to lead the nominee to within an inch of the concluding proposition in a statement of religious doctrine, such as
Evangelium Vitae.
Jefferson wrote in the Statute of Virginia for Religious
Freedom that testing for politically appealing religious beliefs
would "corrupt the principles of that very religion it is meant to
encourage, by bribing, with a monopoly of worldly honors and
emoluments, those who will externally profess and conform to
it." 96 As a student of the Gospel, Jefferson surely knew that, of
the twelve Disciples present at the Last Supper, one could be
made by the fear of the civil authority to deny three times in a
single night ever knowing Jesus, and another could be bribed
into betraying him. 97 If Jefferson was correct in his assessment
of the temptation presented by "worldly honors and emoluments," then one could hardly imagine in the modern American
political sphere a better example of such bribery of conscience
than a senator's tacit (if not explicit) offer to support a nominee's lifetime appointment to the Supreme Court if he will renounce publicly those contentious tenets of his religion that annoy a particular political faction whose influence the senator
cannot ignore. The suspicion with which the Constitution views

96. Statute of Virginia for Religious Freedom at 312 (cited in note 34).
97. See, e.g., Matthew 26:69-75 (denial by Peter of any knowledge of Jesus); id. at
26:47-56 (betrayal of Jesus by Judas lscariot).
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such questioning should be a safeguard for individual liberty that
pro-choice and pro-life groups both applaud with equal gusto.
B. OBJECTION TO RELIGIOUS DEVOTION

There is an alternative interpretation of Governor Wilder's
remarks that is less offensive to Catholicism as a religious sect,
but it is an interpretation that nonetheless reveals other unpalatable facets of religious tests. Governor Wilder's reference to
Judge Thomas' "very devout" religious beliefs could be understood to imply that there should be a sliding scale of senatorial
scrutiny of judicial nominees that depends on the perceived
moderation or extremity of each nominee's particular religious
beliefs. Someone with "very devout" beliefs presumably must
be more closely scrutinized than someone with tepid religious
beliefs or no religious beliefs at all. After all, one could argue,
the very devout nominee might be a religious fanatic. 98
There are four problems with the Senate's attempting to
scrutinize the intensity of a nominee's religious devotion. Those
problems are insuperable and thus merely underscore the wisdom and importance of the Religious Test Clause as an absolute
bar to such inquiry.
1. The Presumption That Justices Cannot Set Aside

Personal Beliefs
Scrutiny of a nominee's religious devotion tacitly presumes
that a Justice of the Supreme Court will decide cases in accordance with his personal religious beliefs rather than the Constitution of the United States that he has sworn to support. 99 This
presumption discards the rather elemental principle that our nation at least aspires to have a Judiciary obedient to the rule of
law. Judge Noonan of the Ninth Circuit summarized the difficulty of such thinking in his 1995 denial of a petition that he
recuse himself from an abortion case because of his Catholicism:
It is a matter of public knowledge that the Catholic Church, of
which I am a member, holds that the deliberate termination of
a normal pregnancy is a sin, that is, an offense against God
and against neighbor. Orthodox Judaism also holds that in
most instances abortion is a grave offense against God. The

98. This theme is explored more generally in Carter, The Culture of Disbelief(cited
in note 2).
99. U.S. Canst., Art. VI,§ 3, cl. 2.
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Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints proscribes abortion as normally sinful. These are only three of many religious bodies whose teaching on the usual incompatibility of
abortion with the requirements of religious morality would
imply that the plaintiffs' business [the provision of abortions]
is disfavored by their adherents. If religious beliefs are the
criterion of judicial capacity in abortion-related cases, many
persons with religious convictions must be disqualified from
hearing them. In particular, I should have disqualified myself
from hearing or writing Koppes v. Johnston, IJ!'holding the
constitutional rights of an advocate of abortion. 1

It is not a satisfactory response, Judge Noonan reasoned, to say
that abortion cases are special and thus deserve extraordinary
rules of recusal that turn on a judge's religious beliefs:
The plaintiffs may object that the disqualification applies only
to cases involving abortion; they are not disqualifying Catholics, Jews, Mormons and others from all judicial office. This
distinction ... [is] unworkable. The plaintiffs are contending
that judges of these denominations cannot function in a broad
class of cases that have arisen frequently in the last quarter of
a century. The plaintiffs seek to qualify the office of federal
judge with a proviso: no judge with religious beliefs condemning abortion may function in abortion cases. The sphere of
action of these judges is limited and reduced. The proviso effectively imposes a religious test on the federal judiciary. 101
To Judge Noonan's assessment one may add that the tacit presumption that a jurist will decide a case on the basis of his personal religious beliefs rather than on the basis of the law provides no rationale for why a jurist's religion should compromise
his objectivity more than his politics or gender or race would.
Surely we would not disqualify nominees to the Court because
they were devout Democrats or Republicans at some point in
their careers. Surely we would not disqualify a gay man from
serving on the Court in the belief that his sexual orientation,
rather than his judicial philosophy, would determine how he
would rule on Say marriage or a case that ~ight o~errule Bo~ers
v. Hardwick. 1
Surely we would not dtsquahfy an Afncan
American from serving on the Court because, as an attorney ear-

100. Feminist Women's Health Center v. Codispoti, 69 F.3d 399, 400 (9th Cir. 1995)
(citation omitted; citing 850 F.2d 594 (9th Cir. 1988)).
101. Id. at 400-01.
102. 478 u.s. 186 (1986).
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lier in her career, she advocated principles of affirmative action
that the Court considered and rejected.
Similarly, it is inappropriate to refer to "the Jewish seat" on
the Court, for that phrase implies that Jews as a religious and
ethnic group have a different perspective on constitutional interpretation from that of gentiles. Such thinking harkens back to
stereotypes from an earlier era. Six years after Louis Brandeis's
appointment to the Supreme Court by President Woodrow Wilson in 1916/ 03 Harvard's president proposed the imposition of a
quota on the admission of Jews, until public indignationincluding a powerful letter from alumnus Learned Handshamed the university into backing down. 104 It is no more appropriate to speak today of "the Jewish seat" on the Court being either vacant or occupied, for it is incompatible with the Religious
Test Clause (as well as the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment) for any number of seats on the Court to be regarded as reserved for, or excluded from, any particular religious
group.
2. The Impracticality and Impropriety of Assessing the
Intensity of Religious Devotion
Inquiry into a nominee's religious devotion would require
the Senate not simply to identify his religious beliefs, but to
gauge their intensity, which surely would transform the inquiry
from the presumptuous to the farcical. In the analogous situation of a petition for recusal, Judge Noonan explained the impracticality and impropriety of measuring the intensity of a jurist's religious devotion:
True, the plaintiffs qualify my beliefs as "fervently-held" as if
to distinguish my beliefs from those that might be lukewarmly
maintained. A moment's consideration shows that the distinction is not workable. The question is whether incapacitating prejudice flows from religious belief. The question is to
be judged objectively as a reasonable person with knowledge
of all the facts would judge. As long as a person holds the
creed of one of the religious bodies condemning abortion as
sinful he must be accounted unfit to judge a case involving
abortion; the application of an objective, reasonable-person
103. See Philippa Strumm, Louis D. Brandeis: Justice for the People (Harvard U.
Press, 1984); Howard M. Sachar, A History of the Jews in America (Alfred A. Knopf,
1992).
104. See Learned Hand, Christians and Jews (1922), in The Spirit of Liberty 20 (U. of
Chicago Press, 3d ed. 1960).
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standard leads inexorably to this conclusion if the plaintiff's
contention is supportable. No thermometer exists for measuring the heatedness of a religious belief objectively. Either religious belief disqualifies or it does not. Under [the Religious
Test Clause of] Article VI it does not. 105

The case of Justice Thomas underscores the impracticality of the
Senate's attempting to supply that religious "thermometer."
Justice Thomas was educated by nuns in a parochial school and
studied in the seminary briefly, yet he divorced and remarried
and reportedly was attending an Episcopal church when nominated to the Supreme Court. 106 The Senate Judiciary Committee, a body whose prestige does not derive from its reputation
for theological insight, surely would stray outside its institutional
competence to inquire, before a television audience of millions,
into a Supreme Court nominee's adherence to or deviation from
the tenets of Roman Catholicism. The spectacle of the Senate's
determining whether a nominee is a devout or a lapsed Catholic
would, of course, never occur. To avoid personal embarrassment and political injury, senators quite understandably would
not care to reveal, in the process of questioning a Supreme Court
nominee, their own possibly limited understandings of religious
doctrine.
3. Inducing a Safe Homogeneity of Religious Belief and
Expression
Even if the Senate were competent to gauge a nominees' religious devotion, such scrutiny would encourage a safe homogeneity in the religious beliefs and expressions of those who aspire
to high public office. This danger is another dimension of J efferson's admonition that religious tests imposed by government
would "corrugt the principles of that very religion it is meant to
encourage." 1 As the Supreme Court noted in Torcaso, religious tests, even if constitutional, would be counterproductive to
the extent that they created a disincentive for honest persons to
aspire to public office. The Court observed that Oliver Ellsworth, "a member of the Federal Constitutional Convention and
later Chief Justice of this Court," published a letter in December
1787 denouncing religious test oaths on the grounds that "testlaws are utterly ineffectual: they are no security at all; because
105.
106.
107.

Feminist Women's Health Center, 69 F.3d at 400 (citation omitted).
In the Pocket of the Pope?, Wash. Post A18 (July 6, 1991).
Statute of Virginia for Religious Freedom at 312 (cited in note 34).
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men of loose principles will, by an external compliance, evade
them. If they exclude any persons, it will be honest men, men of
principle, who will rather suffer an i~ury, than act contrary to
the dictates of their consciences .... " 1 8
One must seriously question whether a devout Amish Mennonite or Mormon or Hasidic Jew or Christian Scientist ever
would be willing to endure the public humiliation of being made
to explain under oath to the Senate Judiciary Committee the
reasons why his adherence to a level of religious devotion that
substantially exceeds the rather secular American norm would
pose no threat to his objectivity as a Justice of the Supreme
Court. For example, would an Orthodox Jew who refuses to eat
swordfish on the grounds that it has no scales 109 be able to apply
"local community standards" to an obscenity case originating in
a socially liberal city, such as Berkeley, California or Cambridge,
Massachusetts? What could he say to prove to the Senate that
the orthodoxy of his religious beliefs would not predispose him
in a case that required applications of a legal standard that embodies a more popular or more homogeneous social attitude?
This argument concerning popular distrust of uncommon religious belief and expression would apply with even greater force
to Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus, Sikhs, Baha'is, and followers of
other religions with which most Americans may be personally
unfamiliar. As the Court in Torcaso noted, in the debate of the
North Carolina Convention on the adoption of the U.S. Constitution, James Iredell, "later a Justice of this Court," said of the
Religious Test Clause: "It is objected that the people of America
may, perhaps, choose representatives who have no religion at all,
and that pagans and Mahometans may be admitted into offices.
But how is it possible to exclude any set of men, without taking
away that principle of religious freedom which we ourselves so
warmly contend for?" 110
Justice Story wrote in 1833 that the lesson to be drawn from
the use of religious tests in England before the American Revolution was that, in matters of religious belief, "the pains and

108. Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 494 n.9 (quoting Paul Leicester Ford, Essays on the Constitution of the United States Published During Its Discussion by the People, 1787-1788 at
170 (Historical Printing Club, 1892)).
109. According to Jewish dietary laws, "only fish that have fins and scales are permitted to be eaten." Shlomo Pesach Toperoff, The Animal Kingdom in Jewish Thought
71 (Jason Aronson Inc., 1995) (citing Leviticus 11:9; Deuteronomy 14:9).
110. Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 495 n.lO (quoting Jonathan Elliot, 4 Debates in the Several
State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 194 (1836-45)).
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penalties of non-conformity" are "enforced with a stern and vindictive jealously." 111 It is worth remembering that, more than a
decade after Justice Story wrote these words, and more than half
a century after the ratification of the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights, the Mormons fled Illinois for the land that was to be
named Utah when, following years of violence and intimidation
against the members of this religious sect, their prophet, Joseph
Smith, was murdered in jail by a mob along with Hyrum Smith,
the church's patriarch. 112 Although Protestants and Catholics do
not wage holy wars against one another in modern America,
even genteel expressions of intolerance-the danger inherent in
the "sophisticated" and "less offensive" questions that Senator
Hatch envisioned in 1991-may nonetheless succeed in intimidating those with heterogeneous religious beliefs from fully participating in civil society.
4. Compelling Rational Explanations for Beliefs,
Through Faith, in Divine Mysteries
A recurrent theme in both the Old Testament and New Testament is the difference between belief through faith and belief
through reason. 113 Indeed, Pope John Paul II issued an encyclicalletter on faith and reason in 1998. 114 Inquiry into a nominee's
religious devotion would inject the rationalism of which lawyers
are so enamored into questions that are inherently insusceptible
to rational explanation. It is hard to imagine, for example, that
pro-choice Catholics who, for purposes of the abortion debate,
rejected on scientific grounds that human life begins at conception would not simultaneously take offense if told that their rejection of that proposition through rational reasoning made all

111. See Story, Commentaries on the Constitution§ 971 at 691 (cited in note 16).
112. See, e.g., Mead, Handbook of Denominations at 98 (cited in note 49); Davis Bitton and Leonard J. Arrington, The Mormons and Their Historians 7 (U. of Utah Press,
1988).
113. A classic example from the New Testament is the story of Jesus' healing of the
servant of the Roman centurion at Capernaum in Galilee. See Luke 7:1-10. The centurion had treated the Jewish elders well and had even helped them to build a synagogue.
So, when the centurion's servant fell gravely ill, the elders came to Jesus to implore him
to go to the centurion's home to heal the servant. As Jesus approached the h~use, the
centurion emerged and told Jesus that he was not worthy to have Jesus enter h1s home.
The centurion explained that, as a man accustomed to authority, he knew that Jesus
needed only to will that the servant be healed for it to happen. Jesus was amazed and
told those following him that he had not encountered anyone with greater faith, even in
Israel. The centurion returned to his house, where the servant emerged, cured.
114. John Paul II, Encyclical Letter Fides et Ratio (1998).
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the more inconsistent their continued belief through faith that
the Virgin Mary immaculately conceived the Son of God.
I do not mean to suggest that a Catholic, employing reason
rather than faith, could only conclude that human life begins at
some moment after conception. 115 Rather, the point here is that
belief through faith in the Creation, the Immaculate Conception,
the Trinity, the Resurrection, and the Second Coming does not
begin with, rel~ on, and end with an epistemological foundation
in rationalism. 16 In the language of economics, reason is not a
substitute for faith; reason may instead be a complement to faith.
The Cambridge theoretical physicist and theologian John Polkinghorne has argued this thesis rigorously in several penetrating
books. 117 Similarly, in private conversations Michael Novak has
conveyed this point with the metaphor that reason can provide
the trellis upon which climbs the living rose, faith.
Religion addresses the transcendent, and for that reason it
would be specious and self-important for those in political life to
scrutinize a Supreme Court nominee's adherence to religious
doctrines according to principles of rational human thought. Indeed, to do so would be tantamount to the establishment of Jeffersonian deism as the state religion. As the Episcopal Church
stated in its Articles of Religion, issued in 1801, "The Power of
the Civil Magistrate extendeth to all men, as well Clergy as Laity, in all things temporal; but hath no authority in things purely
spiritual. " 118 In strikingly similar language, a delegate to the
North Carolina Convention on the adoption of the U.S. Constitution stated that the Religious Test Clause "leaves religion on
the solid foundation of its own inherent validity, without any
connection with temporal authority." 119 If divine mysteries are
115. Compare Jed Rubenfeld, On the Legal Status of the Proposition that "Life Begins at Conception", 43 Stan. L. Rev. 599, 625 (1991) (proposition that life begins at
conception is "virtually unintelligible"), with Robert P. George, Public Reason and
Political Conflict: Abortion and Homosexuality, 106 Yale L.J. 2475 (1997) (refuting
Professor Rubenfeld).
116. Sec, e.g., Karl Rahner, The Trinity 46 (Joseph Donceel, trans., Crossroad Publishing Co., 1970) ("It is evident that the doctrine of the Trinity must always remain
aware of its mysterious character, which belongs to the divine reality, insofar at least as
we are concerned, now and forever, hence also in the blessed vision. For even in the vision God remains forever incomprehensible.").
117. See, e.g., John Polkinghorne, Belief in God in an Age of Science (Yale U. Press,
1998); John Polkinghorne, Science and Theology: An Introduction (Fortress Press, 1998).
118. See Articles of Religion, Art. XXXVII (Protestant Episcopal Church in the
United States of America, Sept. 12, 1801 ), reprinted in The Book of Common Prayer at
867,875 (cited in note 49).
119. See Elliot, 4 Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the
Federal Constitution at 200 (cited in note 110), cited in Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 495 n.10.
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indeed the work of a supreme being, then those mysteries hardly
need to stoop to the limits of rational human understanding.
IV. IS THERE ANY EFFECTIVE PRIVATE REMEDY
OR PUBLIC SANCTION FOR VIOLATION OF THE
RELIGIOUS TEST CLAUSE?
If we ascribe legal meaning to each clause of the Constitution and exclude the possibility that entire clauses of that document are merely hortatory bromides for good government, then
we must ask: What private remedy would be available to the
nominee to public office who had been subjected to a religious
test? What public sanctions would lie against government officials who subjected a nominee to the religious test? The answers
are surprising. The nominee has no effective private remedy.
For a senator violating the Religious Test Clause, the only effective public sanction would be that which the Constitution empowers the Senate to impose under its internal rules for punishing misconduct. There is not likely to be any judicially
enforceable public sanction against a senator who violates the
Religious Test Clause.

A. THE ABSENCE OF AN EFFECTIVE PRIVATE REMEDY
FOR THE NOMINEE FOR THE VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHTS
UNDER THE RELIGIOUS TEST CLAUSE
"The very essence of civil liberty," said the Supreme Court
in Marbury v. Madison, "certainly consists in the right of every
individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury." 120 A nominee who has been subjected toquestioning in violation of the Religious Test Clause, however, has
no viable private remedy against the senator committing the violation. That conclusion also holds, for slightly different reasons,
for government officials other than senators.
1. Does an Implied Cause of Action Exist under Bivens?
A violation of the Religious Test Clause is a violation of a
nominee's constitutionally guaranteed right of religious freedom.
Such a violation therefore should give rise to an implied cause of
action under an explicit constitutional provision, as in Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents. 121 Congress has not created an
120.
121.

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
403 U.S. 388 (1971). For a discussion of the deterrent rationale of Bivens, see
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equally effective statutory remedy for violation of the Religious
Test Clause that would substitute for an implied cause of action
under the Constitution. 122 Nor are there "special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress."123 Senators discharging their Advice and Consent duties
in connection with judicial nominations are not timid; nor should
they collectively be presumed to harbor invidious motives. Thus
they would not seem the least bit "likely to be unduly inhibited
in the r:erformance of their duties by the assertion of a Bivens
claim." 24 Thus, although it obviously would be a case of first impression, a Bivens claim by a judicial nominee against a senator
for violation of the Religious Test Clause would, in principle,
seem well founded. But there are two immediate problems with
such a theory, one legal and the other practical.
The legal difficulty would be to identify a remedy. If, for
simplicity, we assume that the rejected Supreme Court nominee
is already an Article III federal judge with life tenure, it is possible that his harm could consist of the difference between his current salary and that of a Supreme Court Justice. But if the
nominee were instead more handsomely paid than a Supreme
Court Justice (as in the case of many partners in law firms and
many distinguished law professors), then the financial harm
would be nonexistent. But obviously lawyers do not aspire to be
appointed to the Supreme Court to get rich, any more than African Americans in the 1950s sat at Woolworth lunch counters in
the South to savor the cuisine. Therefore, predicating the measure of harm to the rejected nominee on forgone income is a silly
exercise. Just as the harm to a person of being denied a public
accommodation on account of race is impossible to measure in
dollars, so also is it impossible to measure in dollars the harm to
a judicial nominee of being rejected from the Supreme Court on
account of his religious beliefs. It is no easier to measure the
(presumably lesser) harm to a nominee of being confirmed only
after having been subjected to improper religious questioning by
the Senate.
What then is the nominee's measure of harm? Harm to
reputation is a possibility. But as a practical matter, the SuFDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 485 (1994).
122. Sec McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 151 (1992); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S.
367, 380-90 (1983); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 299-304 (1983); Schweicker v.
Chi/icky, 487 U.S. 412, 425 (1988).
123. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396-97.
124. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 151 (1992).

42

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 18:9

preme Court's attenuation, on First Amendment grounds, of the
law of defamation of public figures since New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan would deny a rejected nominee any viable tort remedy
resembling libel or slander. 125 Unless a violation of the Religious
Test Clause would automatically trigger punitive damages, there
would be a serious risk that a Bivens actions predicated on such
a violation would be dismissed under Rule 12(b)( 6) for failing to
state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. 126
Perhaps the remedy sought would be no more than a declaratory judgment that a particular senator had violated theReligious Test Clause. 127 Such a private remedy might publicly
humiliate the offending senator. But it is unlikely to be pursued
for a second, more practical reason. A person whose nomination
to the Supreme Court has failed because of religious bigotry
cannot be expected to prolong his hardship by filing a lawsuit
against a U.S. senator. In the public's eye, such an action could
paint the nominee as a Captain Ahab, embittered to the point of
obsession.
If the person urging the Senate's use of a religious test were
himself not a member of the Senate, then a Bivens action would
fail entirely. In Governor Wilder's case, for example, no Bivens
action for violation of Judge Thomas's civil rights could have extended to the governor because he lacked the "color of law" for
purposes of infringing the Religious Test Clause. In such a case,
the injured nominee would have to resort to common law tort
theories of defamation and the like. As noted above, however,
such claims would have no serious chance of success in light of
the nominee's status as a public figure under New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan and the speaker's own ability to assert his own
rights under the First Amendment to speak freely and to petition
government.
2. The Speech or Debate Clause as a Bar to Punishment
Even a senator making public comments about a nominee's
religious beliefs would, in most circumstances, elude any private
remedy by virtue of the immunity conferred on him by the
Speech or Debate Clause, which provides that, "for any Speech
125. 376 u.s. 254 (1964).
126. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6).
127. Cf. Anderson v. Laird, 316 F. Supp. 1081 (D.D.C. 1970), rev'd on other
grounds, 466 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (seeking declaratory ruling that the Religious
Test Clause had been violated).
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or Debate in either House, [a member of Congress] shall not be
questioned in any other Place." 128 The immunity conferred,
however, is only for speech or debate occurring "in either
House." If a senator were to advocate on the editorial page of
the New York Times that the Senate reject a particular Supreme
Court nominee unless he disassociated himself from certain
teachings of his religion, the Speech or Debate Clause would not
grant immunity. 129 The senator's comments would not have
been made "in either House" of Congress. Of course, on these
facts it is not clear that the senator would need any immunity, as
his remarks might not even be considered to manifest state action with respect to the Senate confirmation process.
Nonetheless, if the senator subsequently inserted into the
Congressional Record a verbatim copy of his op-ed piece from
the New York Times, the speech or debate presented in the
newspaper then would be transformed into "Speech or Debate
[occurring] in either House." A court would surely find unpalatable a spurned judicial nominee's theory of harm that would require the court to reject legislative immunity on the grounds that
a senator uttered speech offensive to the Religious Test Clause
in the New York Times before uttering identical speech within
Congress. 130
3. Automatic Confirmation of the Nominee
The Wilder imbroglio in 1991 illustrates some of the difficulties associated with identifying a private remedy for violations
of the Religious Test Clause. That Governor Wilder promptly
apologized for his remarks spoke well of his decency, 131 but it
hardly repaired the injury from his having told reporters that
Judge Thomas' allegiance to the Pope had to be publicly scrutinized. Like a prosecutor's improper remark to a jury, Governor
Wilder's remark could not be expunged from the public consciousness even if he sincerely regretted having made it. The
remedy in the case of prosecutorial misconduct in a criminal
128. U.S. Const., Art. I,§ 6.
129. See United Srates v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501,512 (1972); Hutchinson v. Proxmire,
443 U.S. 111 (1979).
130. Cf. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 313 (1973); but sec Laurence H. Tribe, 1
American Constitutional Law 1019 (Foundation Press, 3d ed. 2000) ("Plainly, it would be
untenable if the Speech and Debate Clause were used, for example, to preclude a court
from inquiring into whether legislators' statements indicated that a particular statute was
enacted out of racial animus or for a forbidden reason under the Establishment
Clause.").
131. Baker and Broder, Wilder in Hot Water at C1 (cited in note 6).
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prosecution is a mistrial. A new jury must be impaneled to hear
the evidence without the biasing remark. But the mistrial analogy does not fit a violation of the Religious Test Clause. There
is only one jury pool-the Senate-and it cannot restore the veil
of ignorance once it has been removed by improper inquiry into
a nominee's religious beliefs. Note also that analogizing the
Senate confirmation of nominees to a trial underscores how candidates for national elective office who encounter religious discrimination have no similar process-oriented remedy. In practical terms, their recourse is limited to being more appealing to
the electorate than their opponents, which Thomas Jefferson
and John F. Kennedy successfully did in 1800 and 1960, respectively, but Alfred E. Smith failed to do in 1928. 132 But this political remedy is circular: If a person holding a minority religious
belief faces bigotry in an election, his remedy is to gain an electoral majority. This would seem to be a satisfactory remedy only
in cases in which the religious bigotry was ineffectual.
The closer analogy than a mistrial for prosecutorial misconduct may be to a coerced confession in violation of the Self Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 133 The nominee is
being made to testify against himself in the sense that the intended purpose of the religious test is to elicit information that
would disqualify the nominee, in the view of his senatorial interrogators, from holding public office. Indeed, the concern over
compelling the nominee to disclose his religious beliefs should
be even greater than the justifiably great concern over compelled self-incrimination, for the nominee's compelled disclosure
about his beliefs is not literally "incriminating" in the least. The
purpose of the nominee's compelled disclosure is to determine
his fitness for public office, not his fitness for criminal conviction
and punishment.
The remedy for a coerced confession in a criminal case is
exclusion of the tainted confession and all evidence that can be
proximately traced to the coerced confession. As a practical
matter, such exclusion of highly probative evidence of guilt may
produce an acquittal of the defendant. The rationale for that
rule is that it deters police misconduct. 134 In the case of a Su132. Sec note 4.
133. U.S. Cons!., Amend. V ("No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself').
134. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see also Dickerson v. United States,
530 U.S. 428 (2000). Any analogy can be stretched to the breaking point, and admitt~dly
I grossly oversimplify here the constitutional jurisprudence and scholarship on the nght
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preme Court nomination, however, the mere exclusion by the
Senate of any evidence of the nominee's religious beliefs would
fail to provide the necessary deterrent effect. The nominee is
not analogous to a suspected criminal, as the nominee's revelation of his religious beliefs does not constitute any legitimate basis for rejecting his nomination (the analogy to "guilt" on
grounds of religious belief). The more closely analogous remedy
for violation of the Religious Test Clause would be automatic
confirmation of the nomination, which would more closely correspond to the practical effect in a criminal trial of excluding selfincriminating evidence that was unlawfully obtained-namely,
acquittal.
There are several obvious problems, however, with employing such a remedy for violations of the Religious Test Clause.
First, it finds no textual basis in the Constitution. It is debatable
whether the Senate could be said to have discharged its Advice
and Consent duties if a nomination were "confirmed" without an
affirmative act of senatorial consent. Perhaps the Senate could,
ex ante, enact a rule providing that its unanimous consent shall
be deemed to have been given to a nomination whenever a senator has infringed the nominee's religious liberty by violating the
Religious Test Clause. But a determination that such an infringement had occurred would itself require a vote by the Senate. As a practical matter, therefore, such a rule would differ in
outcome from an ordinary confirmation vote only if the Senate
would vote to find a violation of the Religious Test Clause with
respect to a nominee who would have been unlikely to have
been confirmed for other reasons. A person should be confirmed for appointment to the Supreme Court because he or she
is extraordinarily able, not because he or she is a "victim."
Second, automatic confirmation would enable one senator's
misconduct to disenfranchise all of the remaining members of
the Senate on the question of whether to confirm or reject a specific nomination. Furthermore, the prospect of automatic confirmation could lead to strategic behavior by those seeking a
"free pass" for the nominee: A contrived controversy over the
nominee's religious belief could be constructed by supporters of

against self-incrimination under the Fifth Admendment. For an insightful analysis, see
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Dirty Harry and the Real Constitution, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1457,
1484 (1997) (reviewing Akhil Reed Amar, The Constituation and Criminal Procedure:
First Principles (Yale U. Press, 1997)).
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the nominee in the hope that it would lead to the nominee's
automatic confirmation.
Third, the Constitution requires the advice and consent of
the Senate on matters of presidential nominees in part to inform
the electorate of the qualities that make a nominee worthy or
unworthy to hold high public office. This informative process is
for the education and benefit of the electorate, and not solely an
inwardly focused exercise of the Senate's prerogative. Such discourse would be foreclosed by resort to the remedy of automatic
confirmation.
In short, automatic confirmation would be unwise and
probably unconstitutional because it would gut the Senate's Advice and Consent powers in the most consequential of all judicial
nominations. One can imagine that, the first time that an automatically confirmed Justice joined a 5-4 decision of the Supreme
Court, a private party would file a lawsuit alleging that the
Court's majority decision was not lawfully issued; the theory
would be that the opinion (overturning the 5-4 holding of
Carhart, for example) was joined by someone never properly
confirmed for appointment to the Court.
Though not a viable proposition, the thought experiment of
automatic confirmation nonetheless is useful because it highlights an important asymmetry of two default rules regarding a
lack of concurrence between the legislative and executive
branches: If the Senate simply declined to vote upon a nomination, it would not "pass" automatically, as would a bill presented
by Congress to the president but not signed by him within ten
days (as long as Congress did not adjourn). 135
B. SENATORIAL PUNISHMENT OF MEMBERS
VIOLATING THE RELIGIOUS TEST CLAUSE
The Religious Test Clause does not appear to support any
judicially enforceable punishment of a senator that would serve
to deter future violations of the Clause. The most that might be
realistically expected would be that the Senate would reprimand
and fine a senator for violating the Clause and disqualify him
from voting on the nomination that he had tainted by his improper remarks.

135.

Sec U.S. Const., Art. I,§ 7, cl. 2.
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In its entire history, the Senate has expelled only fifteen
members, including fourteen who had been charged with supporting the Confederacy during the Civil War. 136 The Senate has
considered expulsion in other cases, but it either has found the
member not guilty or has failed to act before the member left office.137 In 1995, for example, the Senate Committee on Ethics
recommended that Senator Robert W. Packwood of Oregon be
expelled for sexual misconduct and abuse of power. He announced his resignation the following day and left the Senate
within a month, without an expulsion vote by the Senate as a
whole. 138 Since 1789, the Senate has censured an additional nine
members. 139
Given the infrequent use of expulsion and censure, it is
probably naive to suppose that the Senate would have any appetite to punish one of its members for violating the Religious Test
Clause. If that is the case, then the Senate's reluctance will have
reduced this explicit constitutional guarantee to having no
greater legal significance than a book on etiquette.
1. Disqualification of a Senator from
Voting on the Nomination
Section 5 of Article I provides: "Each House may determine
the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly
Behavior, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a
Member." 140 This provision would empower the Senate, acting
under "the Rules of its Proceedings," to punish a senator who
had violated the Religious Test Clause by barring him from participating in the confirmation vote on the nomination in question, as well as any further hearings or debate on the matter. In
the extreme (but unlikely) case, the Senate could disqualify the
offending member from voting by expelling him entirely.
The most obvious deficiency of relying on disqualification
or expulsion as a remedy is the one mentioned earlier. If one
senator taints the confirmation proceeding, the fact that he is
disqualified from voting and ninety-nine others remain to vote
on the nomination in its tainted state does nothing to remove the
136. See Anne M. Butler and Wendy Wolff, United States Senate Election, Expulsion and Censure Cases, 1793-1990 (Gov't Printing Office, 1995); <www.scnatc.gov/
learning/brief_20.htmb.
137. See Butler, United States Senate Election (cited in note 136).
138. Sec id.
139. Sec <http://www.senatc.gov/lcaming/brief_20.htmb.
140. U.S. Canst, Art. I,§ 5, cl. 2.
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taint. Even expulsion would not change this situation. Thus,
while some might regard disqualification as a necessary remedy,
it would not be a sufficient one.
Furthermore, as the episode involving Judge Thomas
teaches, Governor Wilder was not a senator (or even a federal
officer) and thus was in no position to require that Judge Thomas submit to a religious oath as a condition of the confirmation
of his appointment to the Supreme Court by the Senate. Governor Wilder had no vote on the nomination. Thus, one could correctly say that Governor Wilder's comments could not violate
the Constitution. Indeed, it is doubtful that any attempted punishment of Governor Wilder for his comment would survive
First Amendment scrutiny. These factors simply underscore the
insidious nature of public debate over a nominee's religious beliefs: A senator opposed to the nominee need not personally
question the person's religious beliefs, as there will be other nationally known political figures not in the Senate who could raise
such questions before the press. Unless a senator could be
proven to have conspired with someone outside the Senate to infringe the nominee's rights under the Religious Test Clause, it is
highly unlikely that any punishment could be imposed on anyone, either by the Senate or by a court.
2. Reprimand and Fine Ordered by the Senate under Its
Power to Punish Members for Disorderly Behavior
The Speech or Debate Clause guarantees that a senator
would not be questioned on his remarks "in any other Place"
than "either House" of Congress. But that guarantee does not
mean that Congress could not question the senator concerning
his remarks. Although it might be considered presumptuous for
the House to question a senator about his remarks on a judicial
nominee, the Senate clearly could, as noted earlier, punish or
expel a senator if it deemed such action to be appropriate.
In connection with a proceeding to punish or expel a senator for violation of the Religious Test Clause, the Senate presumably could question the member if he chose to appear to defend himself in a hearing on an order to show cause why he
should not be disciplined. Given the collegiality of the Senate
owing to its smaller size and longer terms than those in the
House, and given the requisite two-thirds vote for expulsion of a
member, it would seem unlikely that the Senate would expel a
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member for violating the Religious Test Clause. 141 A more
likely, less harsh punishment than expulsion would be a reprimand accompanied by a Senate order that the disorderly member pay a fine, which the Senate could then give to the nominee
suffering the violation of his rights under the Religious Test
Clause. There is a recent, well-known model for imposing a fine
as a penalty for misconduct, albeit in the House rather than the
Senate: In January 1997, the House of Representatives reprimanded Speaker Newt Gingrich for ethical misconduct and fined
him $300,000. 142
The Senate could further demand from the disorderly senator, upon implicit threat of more serious punishment such as expulsion or demotion from choice committee assignments, that he
formally apologize to the nominee in a letter that the Senate
would order to be published concurrently in the Congressional
Record and posted on the Internet. To have teeth, the apology
and publication would have to be ordered to occur before the
Judiciary Committee's vote on the nomination.
Because such an order by the Senate would be taken pursuant to its explicit powers under Article I to discipline its members, it is extremely unlikely that a court would be willing to review the order. Rather, the court would more likely regard the
case as presenting a political question that has been textually assigned to the legislative branch by the Constitution. 143
CONCLUSION
The Framers guaranteed that a nominee for national office
would not be made to divulge or disavow his understanding of
God. This simple rule has been lost in judicial nominations,
however, as the controversy over abortion has come to dominate
every other topic of discourse in American constitutional law.
Apart from whatever one thinks of abortion and the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence on the subject, this debasement of the
process of nominating and confirming Justices to the Supreme
Court is to be lamented. At its worst, the demand that a judicial
nominee explain his religious beliefs on abortion to the Senate is
a call to discard the protections of the Religious Test Clause in
141. See United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 518 (1972); but see Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
142. See Adam Clymer, House, in a 395-28 Vote, Reprimands Gingrich, N.Y. Times
A1 (Jan. 22, 1997).
143. Sec Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
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the name of advancing some other preferred constitutional right.
At its best, any theologically rigorous religious testing of a Supreme Court nominee by the Senate would be intractable, if not
also excruciating. The Framers wisely foreclosed the possibility
entirely.
Although the Religious Test Clause is a fundamental constitutional protection of individual liberty, a violation of the Clause
evidently fails to produce, in either legal or practical terms, any
private remedy for the nominee. The Religious Test Clause also
fails to provide any judicially enforceable public sanction for the
offending senator. Unless the Senate steps in to fill the void, the
abortion debate-or some equally divisive moral debate that will
inevitably arise in the future-will reduce the Religious Test
Clause to being no more than hortatory in connection with
nominees to the Supreme Court. The Senate could provide the
effective remedy and sanction that are needed by reprimanding
and fining members who violate the Religious Test Clause, by
disqualifying them from participating in the confirmation vote
for the nominee whose religious freedom has been infringed, and
by ordering that their fines be paid to the nominee.
By virtue of his oath to support the Constitution, each
member of the Senate has a duty to respect that document's
guaranty that a nominee's religious beliefs will play no part
whatsoever in the evaluation of his qualifications to sit on the
Supreme Court. If the Senate fails to recognize the significance
of the Religious Test Clause, it will retreat from the Constitution's monumental achievements for religious freedom and permit senatorial evaluation of a nominee's qualifications to degenerate into precisely the kind of inquisition that Thomas Jefferson
eloquently denounced and the Framers subsequently forbade.

